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Procreative Ethics
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I am currently thinking about how we might justify procreation in light of a recent challenge that our lives contain too much harm to permissibly start, and in light of recent psychological research that we radically overestimate the quality of our lives. I contend that the best arguments that we should stop procreating are much more epistemic than anti-natalists like David Benatar (or their pro-natalist critics like Elizabeth Harman) tend to appreciate. That is, instead of saying that 'our lives contain too much harm to permissibly start', the best anti-natalist arguments suggest that 'we lack knowledge that our child's life will not contain too much harm to start -- and so shouldn't risk procreating.' I then seek to answer the procreative skeptic in a number of ways, having to do with the nature and role of skeptical arguments in philosophy, the promises of reproductive technology, and a novel argument that our lives are much more valuable than we think: one that is rooted in the connection between lotteries, value, and the non-identity problem.
In addition to these normative questions about procreation, I am also thinking about how parents should treat their children when they develop in ways that run radically against their interests, beliefs and values. I think there are theoretically difficult (and practically urgent) moral and political questions here that are often overlooked.
Moral Disagreement and the Value of Ethics
Following my dissertation I plan to think more about moral disagreement and the value of ethics (or more accurately the value of doing normative, applied and meta ethics), a topic that has received surprisingly little attention. Although moral disagreement has led many philosophers to ask questions about whether moral realism is true, and about whether moral testimony can be authoritative, I will explore how we might think about the value of the study of ethics in light of (1) the reality of persistent disagreement among apparent philosophical peers in ethics; (2) the widespread assumption that ethics should not merely be truth-seeking but also action guiding; and (3) meta-ethical uncertainty about all strands of moral realism. Finally, I will explore whether the value problem is harder for ethics than it is for other sub-fields in philosophy and for various non-philosophical, including scientific, disciplines as well.
Paper for Conscientious Refusals Project
Conscientious Refusals and the Reason-Giving Requirement
Abstract. A number of moral philosophers have argued for what is called the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusals in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, those who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment -- such as emergency contraception -- must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked worry from epistemology. In particular,
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tandard views about epistemic rationality and knowledge would make the reason-giving requirement either too easy or too difficult to satisfy. I close by considering whether a version of the reason-giving requirement can be salvaged despite these important theoretical difficulties.
For more on the 'Conscientious Refusals in Reproductive Healthcare' project including information about our research team see the link here
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